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Abstract
In Sloterdijk’s analyseis, we can recognize distinguish the dual function of the 
media. On the one hand, the media can have a negative role: they it conceals 
the ““truths”” of the existing world. Under Tthe mass of information conceals 
the importance of the entirety of events and is lost, where the post-European 
man uses media for entertainment, to entertain, for play, or for masking 
reality. In that context, information serves itself; its purpose is to flow. Such 
“fragmentation” prevents disables the subject from to facinge reality. On the 
other hand, the role of the media can be constructive: the Ccontemporary media 
has the ability to dilate existing closed schemes which act as to deifying the 
state or a specific institution. If information is properly matched and molded 
the news does not have to be fragmentary, but rather it can represent oneness. 
That oneness is alive and in motion because new contents constitutes the frames 
through which a particular phenomenon can be observed. Thus, from the masked 
reality, it enters the process of revealing the truth, namely unmasking the truth 
from the layers of layers of delusions that hide (or represent) reality.
Key words: information, media, unmasking reality, Sloterdijk.
T. Todorović, Unmasking Reality in Sloterdijk’s Philosophy
2248
Introduction: the Naked Truth or the Aspects of Reality 
It seems that in the modern technical world, where nudity is put on daily display by marketing 
and advertisements, where sciences search for naked facts to establish their own truth and “open 
dialogue” is a policy requirement, reality itself remains hidden. The question about the basis of 
reality is no longer asked and reality seems to be masked by philosophy, religion, ideology, science 
and all other specific spheres of humanity. Individuals sometimes simply express their own 
opinions and sometimes adhere to one of these spheres, demanding that their ideas be given general 
importance and entering the field of criticism through the media as the sole bearers of the absolute 
truth. Constant discussions about the prevalence of one paradigm over another tend to neglect a 
specific characteristic of their efforts resulting from the legacy and mindset of the Enlightenment. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that reality is pure illusion in such a world also claims its validity.232 The 
media scene turns into a combat zone, with all combatants aiming to present their own truth, adopt 
it, shape it and impose it on others. However, on this very scene, where opinions conflict and meet, 
it becomes clear that none of them can encompass the whole reality. Reality, outlined only by the 
combination of all the various paradigms, is by its very nature changeable as the content shaping 
it is in constant flux. Man always strives for the naked truth, “cold, hard facts of reality”, but he is 
forced to live in a world where the truth can no longer be delivered ready-made. Sloterdijk has been 
trying to reflect on the modern world in its processuality precisely by means of the media. The need 
to revert to the old manner of thinking is more evident than ever as the past seems to have known 
the truth.233 However, it quickly becomes obvious that this need cannot be fulfilled as the truth 
has never been achieved. This is why it should be reasoned about in the world of intermediation 
of various instances of power, wherein the subject is also the agent and the media are the key link 
between individual and general public opinions.
The early Sloterdijk relied considerably on the critical theory and some basic ideas of German 
idealism. The German idealists considered the issue of criticism as crucial in the context of examining 
the possibilities of negative dialectics. While some claimed that in the contemporary world criticism 
completely lost its purpose, according to the critical theory, criticism only seemingly weakened. 
The philosophical response to the issue of criticism is never given with an aim to stay neutral, but 
also to show how it functions when it permeates diverse social structures and forms. Can one still 
find a basis for criticism; or has it become a mere expression of repressive desublimation through 
which individuals satisfy their need for “sublime thoughts”? Has ostensible action turned into 
ostensible criticism, with reality and the media left to the ebb and flow of the post-European world 
in which the masses call the tune? Is there a difference between criticism and cynicism; or do Kant 
and Diogenes walk arm in arm in the contemporary world? Does Sloterdijk reflect on the media 
on the basis of negative dialectics or does he show that the media do not contain one truth, but the 
aspects of it?234
232 Baudrillard, Jean, The Perfect Crime, London - New York: Verso, 1996, p. 14.
233 Weibel, Peter, “Sloterdijk and the Question of an Aesthetic”, In Medias, Amsterdam University Press, 2011, p.15.
234	Gasset	believes	that	Plato	was	the	first	to	observe	the	aspects	of	reality	and	that	contemporary	philosophy	examines	this	
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The reliance on German idealism should demonstrate that criticism has a twofold basis in 
consciousness: on the one hand it is a false expression of a “bad” consciousness, while on the other 
it represents the deepest need of consciousness to overcome itself by rescinding (Aufhebung) its own 
existing forms. If any logic can be used to analyse the media, or criticism, then the most appropriate 
one could be the analogical comparison of consciousness and the media. In the contemporary 
world, in which the question of analysing the logic of reality has remained a question, it is quite 
challenging to ponder on any social form without knowing its specific origin. Nevertheless, if 
consciousness is taken as a starting point for such consideration, it becomes obvious that the said 
reality develops into a whirlwind swirling around it, both in thoughts and in action. The consideration 
of criticism on the basis of idealism is not aimed at adopting the basic hypotheses of the critical 
theory. On the contrary, Sloterdijk reflects on the contemporary world precisely in its processuality 
and changeability, demonstrating that the criticism of the Freiburg School may have gone a step 
further than that of the Frankfurt School.235 In the media world pieces of information fly, move, 
form, clash and change, turning into the aspects of reality and constantly missing any basis for 
analysis. However, it seems that such a world where information meets and parts, forming a new 
truth all over again, needs a comprehensive philosophical reflection, required by the forward-looking 
critical philosophy. It is a question of “syntheticity without synthesis”.236 Sloterdijk precisely tries to 
reason about the possibility of synthesising and shaping the truth in the media, where information 
contradictory information is often presented as a manifestation of reality. How is that possible? 
First, it is important to think about the media as something changeable and fragile, something that, 
rather than being a mere transmitter first fashions the truth that it subsequently represents. The term 
media is here taken in the widest context and includes printed newspapers, electronic media, social 
networks, columns and blogs as well as private internet forums and websites. The contemporary 
world differs from the previous epochs in that it can network individuals. The globalised world is 
a synchronized world.237 This is a space that has enabled the diversity and manifold functionality 
of the media. The truth, created in the abundance and wealth of content, is conveyed by a medium. 
Does it retain any traces of reality?
The media have consequences for the real world, which means that they are not only a reflection 
of reality, but also a force. Hegel’s phenomenological analysis of consciousness influenced both 
critical and dogmatic philosophers precisely because in his considerations consciousness is not 
designated as a ready-made entity, but as a force. Consciousness is a force because it acts as a 
idea	in	the	context	of	reflection	on	history.	He	demonstrates	that	phainomenon	is	in	fact	an	aspect,	neither	the	outright	
lie	nor	the	plain	truth,	but	an	outline	of	reality	subsequently	used	to	constitute	the	whole	picture.	See	Ortega	y	Gasset,	
José and Talbot, Toby, The Origin of Philosophy, New York, North & Company, 1967, p. 46.
235	Elden,	Stuart.	And	Mendieta,	Eduardo,	“Being-with	as	making	worlds:	the	‘second	coming	of	Peter	Sloterdijk”, Envi-
ronment and planning D: Society and Space, 27(1), Durham: Durham University Library, 2009, p. 10.
236	Prole,	Dragan,	“Tertium datur: Sloterdijk and philosophy of the media”, Zbornik Matice srpske za drustvene nauke, 
133,	Novi	Sad:	Matica	srpska,	2010,	p.	11.
237	Sloterdijk,	Peter,	En el mundo interior del capital: para una teoría filosófica de la globalización,	Madrid:	Siruela,	
2007, p. 172.
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medium between two forces, which appear in it as one.238 The force of consciousness splits into 
two forces, which are not extremes, but coexist in unity. How does that happen? Consciousness 
always somehow moulds the content reaching it in an effort to proclaim it as the absolute truth of 
reality, dogmatically accepting a given as the total. The first force of consciousness adheres to final 
determinations, trying to identify itself in relation to them and save itself while staying the same. It 
also seeks to convey its own truth to the others as the absolute truth and to impose its point of view. 
The other force of consciousness, however, wants change. It is not satisfied with what is given, but 
looks for new content, which will subsequently change and shape it. It puts into motion the wheel 
of education and formation of the personality which owns it. Rather than breaking down under the 
wealth of information and content, it tries to shape and form them. Scepticism and criticism are 
instrumental in changing and developing consciousness as they make it question the established 
patterns and seek new truths by which to analyse reality. Consciousness is a change, the same as 
reality. However, during the change, consciousness always accepts something as truth. The media, 
which in the contemporary world express individual conscious efforts, rather than just being the 
long arm of authority, can be analysed using the logic of movement of consciousness itself. The 
globalised world requires individuals, exposed to a flood of information, to change, transform and 
analyse reality on their own. An event is never simply given to them, or presented as the truth. They 
have to revise it, immersed in the abundance of content, and often also to comment on it, demanding 
that their aspects of reality become the whole truth. The media are intermediaries in this process. 
There is no longer only one authority that determines the truth, there are many. Therefore, a certain 
“truth” appears in varied forms in various media, which provide a space for the collision of individual 
and general opinions. In this process, an individual consciousness tries to impose its own “critical” 
opinion, demanding that its point of view become absolute. Individuals are the bearers of presented 
truths, often unaware that their opinions are only individual aspects of reality. 
In this very process, however, the consciousness of an individual, exposed to an abundance of 
new content, is not satisfied with either the final imposed truths or with its own truths, so that the 
individual has a need to network, ask for another opinion, another view of reality. Swamped by 
information, man creates his own truth, to some extent freely and to some extent based on his own 
beliefs. Sloterdijk even wonders if it is at all possible to meet the Nietzschean demand for genuine 
thinking under such conditions.239 He concludes that in the networked world the difference between 
the vulgar and the noble life narrows to a minimum. Individuals connect on a general level, while 
the media present some basic values and truths as equal. Homo vulgaris or mass man becomes 
dominant. Nietzsche’s distinction between the Übermensch and décadence may turn out to be 
only imaginary.240 In order to live a genuine life, individuals will resort to the past, to religion or 
238	Hegel,	G.W.F.,	Fenomenologija duha, (The Phenomenology of Spirit),	Belgrade:	Beogradsko-Grafički	izdavački	za-
vod, 1986, pp. 83-85.
239	Sloterdijk,	Peter,	En el mundo interior del capital: para una teoría filosófica de la globalización, p. 186.
240	Other	authors	have	also	dealt	with	the	issue	of	possibility	of	genuine	thinking	in	the	globalization	process.	Cf.	Ortega	
y Gasset, José, La rebelión de las masas, Espasa-Calpe, 1964, p. 19.
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to other civilizations that are “different” from the European culture of thought. Yet the question 
remains whether such an escape is possible. Sloterdijk demonstrates clearly that regression is not 
a solution.241 Regression is impossible, and by regression he means all forms of thought that in 
history may have pretended to be the whole truth. Sloterdijk thus finally dissociates himself from 
the Enlightenment thought and, while building on the critical and idealist theories, demonstrates 
that he differs from them.
Media in the Post-European World
The modern way of thought is characterized by the trust in rationality and in the possibility of 
systemic formulation of truth. The Enlightenment is only one of the movements that emerged in 
this period. There is no exact definition of the Enlightenment nor do all authors agree that it can be 
defined: “Once it is no longer self-evident, the term Enlightenment appears to be so ambiguous that 
everything about it becomes suspicious: its origin, the possibility to define its meaning, the regime 
of its legitimate use and the positioning of what it relates to in space and time.”242 However, the 
way that contemporary authors refer to it reveals some key elements of this movement: the trust 
in rationality, education and progress. It is very questionable whether the German idealism and 
critical theory can be considered just as an advanced form of the Enlightenment way of thought. 
The idea of dialectics was meant to represent the overcoming of specific forms of rationalism by 
one whole truth, which in its negative moment should be comprehended in movement. Adorno 
emphasizes that one should not blame the Enlightenment as a movement, as this would mean 
denying the responsibility of those who abused some of its basic truths.243 The idea of dialectics is 
thus also viewed in its critical function, which is meant to comprise two elements: the knowledge 
of society as a totality and the involvement of spirit, which should be recognized in it as an object. 
Nevertheless, his insights demonstrate that a subject rarely analyses itself realistically in relation 
to the existing schemes. The one who does not fit is simply an eccentric, although it is debatable 
whether in a completely transparent and open world anyone can withdraw and hide. According to 
critical authors, capitalism consumes both the body and the soul; it is all-pervading, all-encompassing 
and leaves no room to individuals to resist the offered.244 Criticism exists only in the sphere of 
education, which is, paradoxically, also affected by the consequences of this production method. 
However, there is still some belief, a vague hope, that a fundamental criticism of the society could 
reveal the delusions of the existing world.
241	Sloterdijk,	Peter,	Has de cambiar tu vida,	Valencia:	Pre-Textos,	2012,	p.16.
242	Krstić,	Predrag,	O čemu govorimo kada govorimo o prosvetiteljstvu, (What Do We Talk about When We Talk about the 
Enlightenment?),	Belgrade:	Institut	za	filozofiju	i	društvenu	teoriju,	2016,	p.	7.
243 Adorno, Teodor, Kritika kulture i društvo, (Cultural Criticism and Society), Filozofsko sociološki eseji o književnosti, 
Zagreb:	Školska	knjiga,	1985,	p.	222.
244	Horkheimer	Max,	Adorno	Teodor,	Kulturna industrija, (The Culture Industry), Dijalektika prosvetiteljstva,	Sarajevo:	
Svijetlost,	1989,	p.	145.
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In contrast with the authors who do not see a problem with the Enlightenment, but with the method 
of criticism as it is practised in a technologically advanced society, Sloterdijk demonstrates that 
there is also a problem with the way of thought. After unmasking various “truths”, he shows that 
criticism does not stem from a unified ground.245 The enlightenment process was interrupted by 
the conflicting powers (hegemony, tradition and bias) in which every piece of knowledge confronts 
another. The conflict between various criticisms, none of which attacks its opponent from a single 
ground, forms the very basis of the contemporary world. The collision of criticisms always derives 
from the position of an instance of power, which also involves subjects as the creators of truth; it 
seems that there is no escape from such a world. In most cases, subjects opt for certain truths as 
genuinely theirs, forgetting that in such a context criticism is a double-edged sword. This happens 
because rationality has defeated the mind’s demands for freedom. We can no longer carry out a 
comprehensive reflection by searching for dead identities, we have to analyse reality its processuality. 
The Enlightenment demanded that many truths be reduced to “the most objective” one.246 However, 
very soon it became clear that the request for objectivity was only another way to establish one of 
the many viewpoints that could not pretend to be the whole truth. Subjective observers were drawn 
into the process of establishing the truth. Not only do they want the truth, they want the naked truth, 
cold hard facts, which they never attain as it is immediately challenged by another criticism.
It is precisely in movement that Sloterdijk tries to reason about the world. If we analyse the loss 
of a single philosophical position on the basis of reality, we only obtain a myriad of various truths, 
which sometimes coexist in conflict and sometimes are mutually indifferent. If this dynamics can be 
analysed at all, then it can be analysed reflectively. However, some authors point out that Sloterdijk 
has not fulfilled his promises. Trusting in the wisdom and truthfulness of the world, in an attempt 
to save philosophy, has remained just a demand, unaccompanied by the methodology by which this 
trust could be justified.247 Sloterdijk’s paradox is between his belief that philosophy is time encircled 
by thoughts and his inability to articulate those thoughts and express them as the total truth. The 
question is why he cannot analyse the work of the concept, but only the “risk of the concept”?248 
What is the role of the media in the whole process? How is it possible to maintain the trust in the 
wisdom of the world and at the same time disown the partial “truths” of the Enlightenment that 
never managed to create one whole truth? 
In the transition between the European and the post-European world, which no longer has any trust 
in the intelligence of the European man, the media play a key role. They dilate special schemes and 
expose authorities that would deify anything and treat it as the absolute truth. The one who wishes 
to think turns into a sceptic as soon as he has to choose between the alternatives. The media are 
therefore central to the “mind broadening” process. They can fulfil that role only if they communicate 
245	Sloterdijk,	Peter,	Critique of Cynical Reason,	Minneapolis-London:	University	of	Minnesota,	1987,	p.	76.
246 Wilson, Neil, Punching Out the Enlightenment: A Discussion of Peter Sloterdijk’s Kritik der zynischen Vernunft, New 
German Critique, (41), 1987, p. 61.
247	Ibid.,	p.	69.
248	Prole,	Dragan,	Tertium datur: Sloterdijk and philosophy of the media, p. 8.
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with the ready-made truths of their own time. This is not a case of preserving the modern mode of 
thought or of giving in to postmodern nihilism, but of attempting to reason about them in unity. In 
addition to being capable of thought, man has a body that exists in the specific circumstances that 
he analyses. The differences between these circumstances and analyses collide in the media and in 
these collisions the truth itself is discovered and changed. The question is whether the contemporary 
subject is aware of its position in the world and whether it wants to be aware of it or just wants to 
be like Narcissus and enjoy the media that reflect “the beauty of its thought”. The contemporary 
man is no longer even a critic, but a cynic, a mass man aware that criticism is the only tool to the 
extent that he reverses it to pretence of not being interested in life. To have a body and an opinion 
means to be able to act.249 To be a creature of action means to be a political creature. Does the 
contemporary subject analyse its potentials? Or is it immersed in everyday life? There are no easy 
answers to these questions because through various modes of expression both the former and the 
latter figure as the truth. The role of the media is to witness that truth.
The media act as intermediaries between various opinions, but also between various bodies. They 
serve as a networking point for individuals, but are a source of disagreements and conflicts too. They 
are the objects of power, while also exhibiting a subjective need for expression and action. Ricoeur 
may be right to argue that the second mode of consciousness referred to in Hegel’s phenomenological 
deliberations finds its foothold precisely in the body and the new experiences that require analysis 
themselves. To have a body means to be open to the world, whether we want it or not.250 Reflection 
comes later. What comes first is an essential wish and need to shape what is given into some kind of 
truth, which in the case of Sloterdijk should be viewed as a framed reality, rather than the absolute 
concept. This may be the main point of his divergence from the idealist thought. The trust in the 
mind is just conditional, with the concept formed not only by the new mode of thought, but also by 
the new experiences requiring a potentially different approach. The media are thus drawn into the 
process and various games of power, but power is nothing else but power to do something,251 which 
means that individuals seem to play a certain role after all. Therefore, acting as intermediaries, the 
media have power, power that shapes and leaves consequences, and their role is not neutral, but 
constitutive, both for the everyday life and for the political world.
249	Bordeleau,	Eric,	Sloterdijk and the Question of Action, In Medias Res, Amsterdam University Press. 2011, p. 167.
250	Ricoeur,	Paul,	Falible Man,	New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	1986,	p.	40.
251	In	German:	macht=power,	machen=doing,	mögen,	vermögen=being	able.	Cf.	Bordeleau,	Eric,	Sloterdijk and the Ques-
tion of Action, p. 178.
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Media – the Area of Homo Humanus or Homo Barbarus?
If the media are viewed in relation to their central role as intermediaries between individuals who 
create and reproduce content and the instances of power that “impose” truth, it becomes clear that 
their final truth is not easy to define. Hegel has shown that human consciousness is ambivalent: 
it aims to remain unalterable and keep its rigid identity, while at the same time trying to acquire 
new content and desiring change. The media is therefore a kind of battlefield in which various 
“opinions” strive to shape themselves into the truth in an effort to maintain something like a 
dominant paradigm, while at the same time reshaping themselves in the abundance of new content. 
In the technical world it is justified to wonder about the role of media in the context of values: is 
their role to preserve the values of humanism or are they an area of chaos in which all truths of the 
human world are relativised?
It should first be noted that Sloterdijk has once again brought into focus the issue of humanism, 
demonstrating that there is no such a thing as “uniform humanism”. The post-European world 
wants to save the mankind from barbarism252. However, in order to achieve this it first has to define 
humanism. It seems that in an alienated world an introverted private subject cannot analyse the 
requirement put forward by the critical theory: the society as a whole. Is man responsible for 
individualization in the area of thought, which is afraid of becoming public, or is his introversion 
a consequence of an alienated, technically advanced world? Not only does the question about 
humanism seek theoretical answers, but it also requires instructions about the preferable direction 
of individuals’ actions. However, if we were to talk about post-European humanism, it should 
be differentiated from humanism as it existed in the previous epochs. First, during the times of 
crises and wars, distancing from the prevailing patterns of thought need not be condemned by the 
public.253 If human values are to be revised, one has to think outside the framework of Eurocentric 
thought philosophers are accustomed to. The human element can never be reduced to a particular 
phenomenon, whether we call it culture, state or tradition. It is not even universal-formal, and it 
seems that each definition of humanism falls short of determining its essence. Heidegger showed 
that the elusive part was precisely the idea that the essence of man could be defined as essentia. 254 
The question about humanism always involves the question about the direction of human activities, 
given that reflection only encompasses the present state of affairs and fails to provide guidance on 
future human activities.
The post-war condition seems to be imposing a paradigm claiming that to think humanistically 
means to think within the framework of death of rationalism and the Enlightenment, which 
derived its truth from rationalism. This in fact means distancing from traditional metaphysics and 
seeking the truth in the possibilities offered by a new science. In fear of making a mistake, man 
252	Sloterdijk,	Peter,	“Rules	for	the	Human	Zoo:	a	Response	to	the	Letter	on	Humanism,”	Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space, 27 (1), 2009, p.15.
253	Ibid.,	p.	15.
254	Heidegger,	Martin,	“Letter	on	Humanism”,	Basic writings, 204, 1977, p.89.
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was weaving a metaphysical net of terms, which was supposed to protect him in his immutability. 
However, due to this very reason, he not only made mistakes, but also committed serious crimes, 
being unprepared to change and accept new truths, both in terms of theory and ethos.255 Man’s 
nature is defined as hexis; he chooses what he is accustomed to as his absolute truth, however, if 
he does not communicate with what is different he paralyses himself, blaming the others for his 
own misfortune. The media, a contemporary means of communication in the globalised world, 
have a major role precisely when it comes to connecting people. Some hope for the post-European 
“humanistic” society could therefore be sought in the media, which simultaneously allow for and 
reveal the delusions of individual thought. Man does not search for the truth to find it, but in order 
to delude himself that he strives towards perfection. However, it soon turns out that he plays his 
role better when he admits that he is a creature of “practice”.256 When admitting a mistake becomes 
an essential element of thought and action, we are closer to our goal. What characterizes barbarians 
is that they think they are the only ones who know the truth and try to impose it to others in the 
form of absolute knowledge.
The media, as the area of connection, indeed inspire hope for young generations, which network and 
connect increasingly more often, finding a common communication language within all differences. 
However, one has to be careful with such an unequivocal presentation of the media. The other side of 
the coin is that connecting always leads to a relativisation of reality, whereas ethics, and the question 
about the all too human, has to be universal if it wants to be well-founded. Kant best demonstrated 
this requirement, although he failed to establish it on the basis of real circumstances. Social networks 
may therefore best demonstrate the twofold aspect of the media: participating individuals try to 
express their own absolute truths, while they also want to be connected and networked, accepting 
the diversity. One could hope that this collision of the worlds would give rise to the truth. Still, 
Sloterdijk shows that humanism also originates from the man’s deepest inner structure, because 
not only does he think thanks to the other, but he lives thanks to the other, too.257 Ever since birth, 
man builds nest, his home, thanks to the community. If nothing else, he owes it gratitude for his 
formation, notwithstanding all faults and mistakes made in the process. However, it remains his 
task to assess his own existence and man is given to himself, as Sartre put it, as “his own task”. In 
the technical world, where he is the instrument of various actions, this task appears to be made more 
difficult. Technics is about discovering results that do not own themselves, which are subjective 
constructs.258 This is why the truth of humanism, which is supposed to have values that man does 
not input himself, but realizes in the community, cannot be sought in that world. However, the 
post-European world partly relies on “mass man”, who can be characterized as a barbarian. What 





filosóficas, (1), 2006, p. 7.
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are his characteristics? The basic one is that he is unwilling to build his own identity, but wants to 
discover it in some existing values. Identity was in the traditional sense considered on the basis of 
classification. This means that identity is built through the differentiation of a subject in relation 
to others. The mass, paradoxically, wants to be differentiated, but it has no distinction based on 
which to demand this differentiation.259 The mass does not discuss humanistic issues until its own 
life is threatened, so that, once it starts to discuss them, it most often assumes radical methods of 
thought, which are in essence anti-humanistic.
What man has forgotten is that reflection is also a form of action.260 This means that absolute 
reflection is impossible as long as man still has a potential to act. Consequently, the fact that 
he knows current circumstances cannot save him from making mistakes in future. This may be 
Heidegger’s criticism of Hegel, but it does not only address his mode of thought, but also traditional 
metaphysics, which in essence tried to reduce the issue of human action to the issue about the 
principles of nature. In the modernity, in which man always appears as the man of two worlds, 
the natural and the free one, it can best be observed how humanism that requires to be reduced 
to theory misses its purpose. The contemporaneity’s requirement for returning to some original 
deliberations in the context of humanism even has to be revised. If it is really possible to revert to 
some original philosophy that “preserved the truth of essence”, it seems that going back does not 
work for humanism. To be a man does not mean to be a rational animale261. This definition contains 
the assumption that rationality can overcome the bestial in man and that there will come a time 
when this will be properly achieved by a theory. However, historical truths deny this possibility. 
Rationality is only one way of human existence. It is wrong to assume that it should be dominant 
as the man’s appearance in the world and for others always results from a variety of efforts. Due to 
the fact that he has reason, man has assumed that he is the king and master of all creatures. Yet, 
being fragile, he is predetermined to be only a “shepherd”.262 This term, which in Christianity has 
a symbolic meaning, indicates that the all too human is neither animal, nor frigidly rational, but 
inherent in the possibility to take care of the other, of the community.263 To be human means to 
care. Although often concealed by hypocritical demands, care is present in the public sphere of the 
media. Admittedly, care for others is often a cover-up for hidden crimes. But this is not the type 
of care that Heidegger refers to. This is an effort that involves the intention of existence to take 
care of those who are different. In the contemporary world, care is also disabled by the long-term 
suppression of the thymotic side of thought and trust in the rational basis of the world. However, 
the suppressed thymos looks for the ways of gratification, and the media become an area where it 
gains the most visibility in the link between individuals and general public opinions.
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Subdued Thymos
Nietzsche demonstrated that the decadence of the modern world was reflected among other things 
in the repression of the Dionysian side of human personality, which makes man a creature of life, 
rather than a frigid, reflexive thinker. This side of human personality, nurtured by the old world, 
was related to thymos, which represents pride, honour, anger, the need for recognition, fairness, 
disgust and revenge. In the old world, these characteristics were also assigned to gods, which 
means that the thymotic side of human personality sought its transcendental foundation. In the 
contemporary technical world, it seems that anger and other emotions are of secondary importance. 
Still, if they are not reflected in a sufficient measure, this does not mean that they do not exist. They 
are no longer expressed “directly”, as in the old world in which a hero would take action to defend 
his honour feeling it a duty he owes primarily to himself. In the contemporary world, the thymotic 
instinct is sublimated and therefore appears in the media in its incomplete form. The fight for 
recognition in the virtual world is an imaginary fight, which, although negative, can have positive 
consequences. Like the Enlightenment, which fails in the area of criticism because each demand 
for truth is just a specific requirement seeking absolute validity, the thymotic fight for recognition 
fails in the technical world because it is not based on clear humanistic assumptions. The context 
for both is a fragmented reality.
The contemporary thymos includes something that contrasts life and can be related to Nietzsche’s 
interpretation of ressentiment as repressed hatred, which accumulates without being expressed. 
However, ressentiment is also double-sided, the capitalist world being a debtor world wherein 
negative emotion is bidirectional. There is guilt, a feeling that we owe a debt to others, which we 
cannot always repay. The debt can be financial, but it can also be owed for some other, community-
based values: upbringing, education, cultural heritage. This guilt breeds double hatred, as both 
debtors and creditors start to hate, creating a world of distrust, which solves its conflicts by means 
of legal norms. “The enemy” is no longer confronted directly. The accumulated instincts are not 
manifested clearly in the context of community, but only within the existing structures, so that 
thymos, which used to have a free playing field, gets distorted based on the established schemes. This 
is not to say that thymos in itself bad, only that the manner of its manifestation is questionable.
Sloterdijk shows the progressive de-thymotization of the world in which hatred has never 
disappeared, but is only repressed. In the capitalistic world, the issue of debt is more often analysed 
in the context of property, whereas thymos of the old world was always connected with the defence 
of honour. The contemporary world, which no longer deifies the state or any other special institution 
as the apex of society, almost completely disregards thymos. What is important are formal relations 
and whether things are regulated and justified under positive law. Reality loses its importance. The 
new world misses another typical characteristic of the old world: those fighting for honour were 
relieved of the need for future, larger conflicts.264 The most successful ones were therefore not too 
264	Sloterdijk,	Peter,	Rage and Time, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p.10.
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irritable, as their value in relation to themselves was not disputed. Ressentiment is an “internal” 
state. Unexpressed hatred also becomes an internal state. In ancient Greece this was inconceivable. 
Hatred aimed at someone else becomes hatred of ourselves, accompanied by guilt felt because we 
cannot articulate our efforts. However, emotion never occurs alone, but is coupled by rationality, 
which justifies acute hatred as the only acceptable state and this is how it works until a conflict 
escalates.
Sloterdijk shows the levels in which the subdued thymos, rage, moves. If expressed, rage is a “healthy” 
state. However, as it is most often impossible to express it the community context, it becomes a 
state in which individuals turn against themselves.265 The basic rule of rage is that those who feel 
it lack recognition, primarily from themselves. As they fail to get recognition from others, they see 
themselves in the same context, unable to distinguish between the views of others and their own. 
This refers to the inability of authentic thinking and introversion with an aim of finding new values 
in relation to imposed ones. Those who feel rage soon start looking for allies for their feelings. They 
are not satisfied with the fact that they hate, they need other people to justify their basest instincts. 
Nietzsche predicted how an ideological world will function when subdued rage makes a claim for 
recognition. It is precisely the accumulation of rage that leads to war. The parties affected by rage 
lack the ability to distance themselves from what they consider their own loss. As a result, the 
communication between those of dissenting opinions becomes difficult.
The accumulation of rage results in the creation of a bank of rage, which places it on time deposits. 
This is where instinct is accumulated, stored and rationally shaped. Desire for revenge comes to be 
interpreted as a need for justice. Those who seek revenge try to represent themselves as victims and 
not as criminals, seeking a rational justification for their actions. Rage expands, becomes long-term 
and generates inheritance. There is always someone who is also affected, who wants to preserve 
the tradition as a whole, including its enemies. Naturally, on the battlefield there are collateral 
victims, but they, as a rule, play a minor role. Time is relative for those in rage. They do not live, like 
ancient Greeks, in their own presence. They live for the day when they get their revenge. Planning 
when and how to get it becomes a lifetime goal, because when reason sleeps, the subdued thymos 
is awake, waiting to express itself. In the context of wars, it seems that each party rationalises its 
aggressive actions, because it is never only about the performance, but also about giving validity to 
the expression of thymos. In the moment of conflict, both parties become aware only of the limits 
of their efforts, but theoretical insight ceases to prevail. Instinct continues to search for a means to 
realize its own goals. The possibility of dialogue gradually diminishes if thymos is not channelled 
in time.
265	Ibid,	p.	23.
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While expressing rage actors gradually become aware of their specific intentions.266 As being on the 
battlefield is a different experience than the common everyday routine, individuals’ actions lose 
their meaning. Realising his fragility, man begins to search for new ways to end the conflict. In 
every war, dialogue is a possibility that the conflicting parties resort to, once they have exhausted 
all others. It is a paradox that a subject, in the contemporary world increasingly more causa sui, 
self-accountable for its mobility and movability, is easily mobilized by other authorities. Its personal 
movement becomes important only in the general context. The movement of the contemporary 
subject is therefore always related to the movement through established mobility schemes.267 In 
the technical world, information is disseminated fastest and communication is visibly established 
on the internet.
Despite the fact that some authors criticize the media, saying that they only seemingly participate in 
the manifestation of negative instincts, one should also emphasise their positive side. Specifically, in 
the media individuals cease to be active subjects, or even to adjust to the established schemes, and 
become the ones who mimic the offered content.268 On the other hand, individuals’ specific beliefs 
become visible in their limitation in collision with other information. In the media the subdued 
thymos occupies the media field as its own playfield. The media field never includes only someone’s 
raw opinions, but it also includes instincts accompanying them. In this manner, it can, on the one 
hand, make the media protect ostensible peace by postponing future conflicts. On the other hand, 
it may be concluded that the media have a twofold role: although they keep individuals at the level 
of the individual, false consciousness, they do allow for a free play of opinions in which the scale of 
conflict decreases. Although disseminating an apocalyptic atmosphere, the media, paradoxically, 
delay the apocalypsis. They become the area of connection and networking, which denies the 
possibility of absolute criticism and brings into focus the request for the recognition of differences. 
No one can predict what the future will be like, but at present it should be stressed that Sloterdijk’s 
method, linking the critical theory and modern nihilism, has completely succeeded in describing 
the twofold function of the media, which represent the manifestation of the individual thymos and 
opinion, as well as its interaction with the schemes of the general spirit of the times. 
266	Cf.	Patočka,	Jan,	“Heretical	Essays	in	the	Philosophy	of	History”	(VI	essay)	Open Court Publishing, 1996.
267	Sloterdijk,	Peter,	“Mobilization	of	the	Planet	from	the	Spirit	of	Self-Intensification”,	The Drama Review, 50 (4), 2006, 
p. 39.
268	Marcuse,	Herbert,	“The	New	Forms	of	Control”,	Technology and Values: Essential Readings, (159), 2010, p. 409.
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Demaskiranje realnosti u Sloterdajkovoj 
filozofiji
Sažetak
U Sloterdajkovim analizama možemo da razlikujemo dvostruku funkciju medija. 
Sa jedne strane, mediji za njega, slično kao i za klasične autore imaju negativnu 
ulogu: oni prikrivaju „istine“ postojaćeg sveta. Pod obiljem informacija gubi se 
važnost celine dešavanja i čovek postevropskog sveta koristi medije za zabavu, 
igru i za maskiranje onoga što se zbilja događa. Informacije služe čisto radi 
informacija i takvo fragmentarno mišljenje onesposobljava subjekta da se 
suoči sa realnošću. Sa duge strane, uloga medija može da bude i konstruktivna. 
Savremeni mediji imaju sposobnost da razobruče postojaće zatvorene šeme koje 
rade u cilju obogotvorenja države ili neke posebne institucije. Ako se informacije 
na pravilan način slože i uobliče pokazuje se da vest  ne mora biti fragmentarna 
već da može da predstavlja jedinstvo. To jedinstvo je živo i u kretanju jer 
novi sadržaji konstituišu okvire kroz koje se  onda može posmatrati određen 
fenomen. Tako se iz maskirane realnosti ulazi u proces raskrivanja istine, tačnije 
demaskiranja istine od slojeva zabluda kojima se prezentuje stvarnost.
Ključne riječi: demaskiranje, informacija, mediji, realnost, Sloterdajk.
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